A3097

An Act concerning driving under the influence and amending N.J.S.2C:11-5, P.L.2017, c.165, and P.L.2014, c.31.

Be It Enacted by the Senate and General Assembly of the State of New Jersey:

1. N.J.S.2C:11-5 is amended to read as follows:

2C:11-5. Death by auto or vessel.

a. Criminal homicide constitutes reckless vehicular homicide when it is caused by driving a vehicle or vessel recklessly.

Proof that the defendant fell asleep while driving or was driving after having been without sleep for a period in excess of 24 consecutive hours may give rise to an inference that the defendant was driving recklessly. Proof that the defendant was driving while intoxicated in violation of R.S.39:4-50 or was operating a vessel under the influence of alcohol or drugs in violation of section 3 of P.L.1952, c.157 (C.12:7-46) shall give rise to an inference that the defendant was driving recklessly. Proof that the defendant was operating a hand-held wireless telephone while driving a motor vehicle in violation of section 1 of P.L.2003, c.310 (C.39:4-97.3) may give rise to an inference that the defendant was driving recklessly. Proof that the defendant failed to maintain a lane in violation of R.S.39:4-88 may give rise to an inference that the defendant was driving recklessly. Nothing in this section shall be construed to in any way limit the conduct or conditions that may be found to constitute driving a vehicle or vessel recklessly.

b. Except as provided in paragraphs (3) and (5) of this subsection, reckless vehicular homicide is a crime of the second degree.

(1) If the defendant was operating the auto or vessel while under the influence of any intoxicating liquor, narcotic, hallucinogenic or habit-producing drug, or with a blood alcohol concentration at or above the prohibited level as prescribed in R.S.39:4-50, or if the defendant was operating the auto or vessel while his driver's license or reciprocity privilege was suspended or revoked for any violation of R.S.39:4-50, section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a), by the Chief Administrator of the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission pursuant to P.L.1982, c.85 (C.39:5-30a et seq.), or by the court for a violation of R.S.39:4-96, the defendant shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment by the court. The term of imprisonment shall include the imposition of a minimum term. The minimum term shall be fixed at, or between, one-third and one-half of the sentence imposed by the court or three years, whichever is greater, during which the defendant shall be ineligible for parole.

(2) The court shall not impose a mandatory sentence pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection unless the grounds therefor have been established at a hearing. At the hearing, which may occur at the time of sentencing, the prosecutor shall establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was operating the auto or vessel while under the influence of any intoxicating liquor, narcotic, hallucinogenic or habit-producing drug, or with a blood alcohol concentration at or above the level prescribed in R.S.39:4-50 or that the defendant was operating the auto or vessel while his driver's license or reciprocity privilege was suspended or revoked for any violation of R.S.39:4-50, section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a), by the Chief Administrator of the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission pursuant to P.L.1982, c.85 (C.39:5-30a et seq.), or by the court for a violation of R.S.39:4-96. In making its findings, the court shall take judicial notice of any evidence, testimony or information adduced at the trial, plea hearing, or other court proceedings and shall also consider the presentence report and any other relevant information.

(3) Reckless vehicular homicide is a crime of the first degree if the defendant was operating the auto or vessel while in violation of R.S.39:4-50 or section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a) while:

(a) on any school property used for school purposes which is owned by or leased to any elementary or secondary school or school board, or within 1,000 feet of such school property;

(b) driving through a school crossing as defined in R.S.39:1-1 if the municipality, by ordinance or resolution, has designated the school crossing as such; or

(c) driving through a school crossing as defined in R.S.39:1-1 knowing that juveniles are present if the municipality has not designated the school crossing as such by ordinance or resolution.

A map or true copy of a map depicting the location and boundaries of the area on or within 1,000 feet of any property used for school purposes which is owned by or leased to any elementary or secondary school or school board produced pursuant to section 1 of P.L.1987, c.101 (C.2C:35-7) may be used in a prosecution under subparagraph (a) of this paragraph.

It shall be no defense to a prosecution for a violation of subparagraph (a) or (b) of this paragraph that the defendant was unaware that the prohibited conduct took place while on or within 1,000 feet of any school property or while driving through a school crossing. Nor shall it be a defense to a prosecution under subparagraph (a) or (b) of this paragraph that no juveniles were present on the school property or crossing zone at the time of the offense or that the school was not in session.

(4) If the defendant was operating the auto or vessel in violation of R.S.39:4-50 [or] , section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a), or section 1 of P.L.2017, c.165 (C.2C:11-5.3) the defendant's license to operate a motor vehicle shall be suspended for a period of between five years and life, which period shall commence upon completion of any prison sentence imposed upon that person.

(5) Reckless Vehicular homicide is a crime of the third degree if the defendant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant did not commit any conduct constituting driving a vehicle or vessel recklessly other than failing to maintain a lane in violation of R.S.39:4-88.

c. For good cause shown, the court may, in accepting a plea of guilty under this section, order that such plea not be evidential in any civil proceeding.

d. Nothing herein shall be deemed to preclude, if the evidence so warrants, an indictment and conviction for aggravated manslaughter under the provisions of subsection a. of N.J.S.2C:11-4.

As used in this section, "auto or vessel" means all means of conveyance propelled otherwise than by muscular power.

e. Any person who violates paragraph (3) or (4) of subsection b. of this section shall forfeit the auto or vessel used in the commission of the offense, unless the defendant can establish at a hearing, which may occur at the time of sentencing, by a preponderance of the evidence that such forfeiture would constitute a serious hardship to the family of the defendant that outweighs the need to deter such conduct by the defendant and others. In making its findings, the court shall take judicial notice of any evidence, testimony, or information adduced at the trial, plea hearing, or other court proceedings and shall also consider the presentence report and any other relevant information. Forfeiture pursuant to this subsection shall be in addition to, and not in lieu of, civil forfeiture pursuant to chapter 64 of this Title.

f. There shall be a presumption of pretrial detention for a violation of subparagraphs (1) and (3) of subsection b. of this section in accordance with section 5 of P.L.2014, c.31 (C.2A:162-19).

(cf: P.L.2017, c.372, s.1)

2. Section 1 of P.L.2017, c.165 (C.2C:11-5.3) is amended to read as follows:

1. a. Criminal homicide constitutes strict liability vehicular homicide when it is caused by driving a vehicle while intoxicated in violation of R.S.39:4-50 or operating a vessel under the influence of alcohol or drugs in violation of section 3 of P.L.1952, c.157 (C.12:7-46).

b. Strict liability vehicular homicide is a crime of the third degree, but the presumption of nonimprisonment set forth in subsection e. of N.J.S.2C:44-1 shall not apply. There shall be a presumption of pretrial detention for a violation of subsection a. of this section in accordance with section 5 of P.L.2014, c.31 (C.2A:162-19). Any person who commits an offense pursuant to this section shall be subject to a driver’s license suspension in accordance with N.J.S.2C:11-5.

c. The provisions of N.J.S.2C:2-3 governing the causal relationship between conduct and result shall not apply in a prosecution under this section. For purposes of this offense, the defendant's act of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated in violation of R.S.39:4-50 or operating a vessel under the influence of alcohol or drugs in violation of section 3 of P.L.1952, c.157 (C.12:7-46) is the cause of death when:

(1) The operation of the motor vehicle or vessel is an antecedent but for which the death would not have occurred; and

(2) The death was not:

(a) too remote in its occurrence as to have a just bearing on the defendant's liability; or

(b) too dependent upon the conduct of another person which was unrelated to the defendant's operation of a motor vehicle or vessel as to have a just bearing on the defendant's liability.

d. It shall not be a defense to a prosecution under this section that the decedent contributed to his own death by reckless or negligent conduct or operation of a motor vehicle or vessel.

e. Nothing in this section shall be deemed to preclude, if the evidence so warrants, an indictment and conviction for any other offense.

(cf: P.L.2017, c.165, s.1)

3. Section 3 of P.L.2014, c.31 (C.2A:162-17) is amended to read as follows:

3. Except as otherwise provided under sections 4 and 5 of P.L.2014, c.31 (C.2A:162-18 and C.2A:162-19) concerning a hearing on pretrial detention, a court shall make, pursuant to this section, a pretrial release decision for an eligible defendant without unnecessary delay, but in no case later than 48 hours after the eligible defendant's commitment to jail.

a. The court shall order the pretrial release of the eligible defendant on personal recognizance or on the execution of an unsecured appearance bond when, after considering all the circumstances, the Pretrial Services Program's risk assessment and recommendations on conditions of release prepared pursuant to section 11 of P.L.2014, c.31 (C.2A:162-25), and any information that may be provided by a prosecutor or the eligible defendant, the court finds that the release would reasonably assure the eligible defendant's appearance in court when required, the protection of the safety of any other person or the community, and that the eligible defendant will not obstruct or attempt to obstruct the criminal justice process.

b. (1) If the court does not find, after consideration, that the release described in subsection a. of this section will reasonably assure the eligible defendant's appearance in court when required, the protection of the safety of any other person or the community, and that the eligible defendant will not obstruct or attempt to obstruct the criminal justice process, the court may order the pretrial release of the eligible defendant subject to the following:

(a) the eligible defendant shall not commit any offense during the period of release;

(b) the eligible defendant shall avoid all contact with an alleged victim of the crime;

(c) the eligible defendant shall avoid all contact with all witnesses who may testify concerning the offense that are named in the document authorizing the eligible defendant's release or in a subsequent court order; and

(d) any one or more non-monetary conditions as set forth in paragraph (2) of this subsection.

(2) The non-monetary condition or conditions of a pretrial release ordered by the court pursuant to this paragraph shall be the least restrictive condition, or combination of conditions, that the court determines will reasonably assure the eligible defendant's appearance in court when required, the protection of the safety of any other person or the community, and that the eligible defendant will not obstruct or attempt to obstruct the criminal justice process, which may include that the eligible defendant:

(a) remain in the custody of a designated person, who agrees to assume supervision and to report any violation of a release condition to the court, if the designated person is able to reasonably assure the court that the eligible defendant will appear in court when required, will not pose a danger to the safety of any other person or the community, and will not obstruct or attempt to obstruct the criminal justice process;

(b) maintain employment, or, if unemployed, actively seek employment;

(d) abide by specified restrictions on personal associations, place of abode, or travel;

(e) report on a regular basis to a designated law enforcement agency, or other agency, or pretrial services program;

(f) comply with a specified curfew;

(g) refrain from possessing a firearm, destructive device, or other dangerous weapon;

(h) refrain from excessive use of alcohol, or any unlawful use of a narcotic drug or other controlled substance without a prescription by a licensed medical practitioner;

(i) undergo available medical, psychological, or psychiatric treatment, including treatment for drug or alcohol dependency, and remain in a specified institution if required for that purpose;

(j) return to custody for specified hours following release for employment, schooling, or other limited purposes;

(k) be placed in a pretrial home supervision capacity with or without the use of an approved electronic monitoring device. The court may order the eligible defendant to pay all or a portion of the costs of the electronic monitoring, but the court may waive the payment for an eligible defendant who is indigent and who has demonstrated to the court an inability to pay all or a portion of the costs; or

(l) satisfy any other condition that is necessary to reasonably assure the eligible defendant's appearance in court when required, the protection of the safety of any other person or the community, and that the eligible defendant will not obstruct or attempt to obstruct the criminal justice process, which shall not include any prohibition or restriction concerning manufacturing, distributing, or dispensing, or possessing or having under control with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, marijuana or hashish in violation of paragraph (12) of subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:35-5, or possession of marijuana or hashish in violation of paragraph (3) of subsection a. of N.J.S.2C:35-10.

c. (1) If the court does not find, after consideration, that the release described in subsection a. or b. of this section will reasonably assure the eligible defendant's appearance in court when required, the court may order the pretrial release of the eligible defendant on monetary bail, other than an unsecured appearance bond. The court may only impose monetary bail pursuant to this subsection to reasonably assure the eligible defendant's appearance. The court shall not impose the monetary bail to reasonably assure the protection of the safety of any other person or the community or that the eligible defendant will not obstruct or attempt to obstruct the criminal justice process, or for the purpose of preventing the release of the eligible defendant.

(2) If the eligible defendant is unable to post the monetary bail imposed by the court pursuant to this subsection, and for that reason remains detained in jail, the provisions of section 8 of P.L.2014, c.31 (C.2A:162-22) shall apply to the eligible defendant.

d. (1) If the court does not find, after consideration, that the release described in subsection a., b., or c. will reasonably assure the eligible defendant's appearance in court when required, the protection of the safety of any other person or the community, and that the eligible defendant will not obstruct or attempt to obstruct the criminal justice process, the court may order the pretrial release of the eligible defendant using a combination of non-monetary conditions as set forth in subsection b. of this section, and monetary bail as set forth in subsection c. of this section.

(2) If the eligible defendant is unable to post the monetary bail imposed by the court in combination with non-monetary conditions pursuant to this subsection, and for that reason remains detained in jail, the provisions of section 8 of P.L.2014, c.31 (C.2A:162-22) shall apply to the eligible defendant.

e. For purposes of the court's consideration for pretrial release described in this section, with respect to whether the particular method of release will reasonably assure that the eligible defendant will not obstruct or attempt to obstruct the criminal justice process, this reasonable assurance may be deemed to exist if the prosecutor does not provide the court with information relevant to the risk of whether the eligible defendant will obstruct or attempt to obstruct the criminal justice process.

f. If the court finds, after consideration of the presumption of pretrial detention established pursuant to subsection b. of section 5 of P.L.2014, c.31 (C.2A:162-19), that a defendant shall not be detained pretrial for crimes established pursuant to paragraphs (3) or (4) of subsection b. of P.L.2014, c.31 (C.2A:162-19), and that the release described in subsection a. of this section will reasonably assure the eligible defendant's appearance in court when required, the protection of the safety of any other person or the community, and that the eligible defendant will not obstruct or attempt to obstruct the criminal justice process, the court may order the pretrial release of the eligible defendant subject to the suspension or revocation of the defendant’s license.

(cf: P.L.2023, c.103, s.1)

4. Section 5 of P.L.2014, c.31 (C.2A:162-19) is amended to read as follows:

5. a. A prosecutor may file a motion with the court at any time, including any time before or after an eligible defendant's release pursuant to section 3 of P.L.2014, c.31 (C.2A:162-17), seeking the pretrial detention of an eligible defendant for:

(1) any crime of the first or second degree enumerated under subsection d. of section 2 of P.L.1997, c.117 (C.2C:43-7.2);

(2) any crime for which the eligible defendant would be subject to an ordinary or extended term of life imprisonment;

(3) any crime if the eligible defendant has been convicted of two or more offenses under paragraph (1) or (2) of this subsection;

(4) any crime enumerated under paragraph (2) of subsection b. of section 2 of P.L.1994, c.133 (C.2C:7-2) or crime involving human trafficking pursuant to section 1 of P.L.2005, c.77 (C.2C:13-8) or P.L.2013, c.51 (C.52:17B-237 et al.) when the victim is a minor, or the crime of endangering the welfare of a child under N.J.S.2C:24-4;

(5) any crime enumerated under subsection c. of N.J.S.2C:43-6;

(6) any crime or offense involving domestic violence as defined in subsection a. of section 3 of P.L.1991, c.261 (C.2C:25-19); or

(7) any other crime for which the prosecutor believes there is a serious risk that:

(a) the eligible defendant will not appear in court as required;

(b) the eligible defendant will pose a danger to any other person or the community; or

(c) the eligible defendant will obstruct or attempt to obstruct justice, or threaten, injure, or intimidate, or attempt to threaten, injure or intimidate, a prospective witness or juror.

b. When a motion for pretrial detention is filed pursuant to subsection a. of this section, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the eligible defendant shall be detained pending trial because no amount of monetary bail, non-monetary condition or combination of monetary bail and conditions would reasonably assure the eligible defendant's appearance in court when required, the protection of the safety of any other person or the community, and that the eligible defendant will not obstruct or attempt to obstruct the criminal justice process, if the court finds probable cause that the eligible defendant:

(1) committed murder pursuant to N.J.S.2C:11-3; [or]

(2) committed any crime for which the eligible defendant would be subject to an ordinary or extended term of life imprisonment;

(3) committed the first or second degree crime of reckless vehicular homicide in violation of subparagraphs (1) and (3) of subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:11-5; or

(4) committed the third degree crime of strict liability vehicular homicide in violation of section 1 of P.L.2017, c.165 (C.2C:11-5.3).

c. A court shall hold a hearing to determine whether any amount of monetary bail or non-monetary conditions or combination of monetary bail and conditions, including those set forth under subsection b. of section 3 of P.L.2014, c.31 (C.2A:162-17) will reasonably assure the eligible defendant's appearance in court when required, the protection of the safety of any other person or the community, and that the eligible defendant will not obstruct or attempt to obstruct the criminal justice process.

d. (1) Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, the pretrial detention hearing shall be held no later than the eligible defendant's first appearance unless the eligible defendant, or the prosecutor, seeks a continuance. If a prosecutor files a motion for pretrial detention after the eligible defendant's first appearance has taken place or if no first appearance is required, the court shall schedule the pretrial detention hearing to take place within three working days of the date on which the prosecutor's motion was filed, unless the prosecutor or the eligible defendant seeks a continuance. Except for good cause, a continuance on motion of the eligible defendant may not exceed five days, not including any intermediate Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. Except for good cause, a continuance on motion of the prosecutor may not exceed three days, not including any intermediate Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.

(2) Upon the filing of a motion by the prosecutor seeking the pretrial detention of the eligible defendant and during any continuance that may be granted by the court, the eligible defendant shall be detained in jail, unless the eligible defendant was previously released from custody before trial, in which case the court shall issue a notice to appear to compel the appearance of the eligible defendant at the detention hearing. The court, on motion of the prosecutor or sua sponte, may order that, while in custody, an eligible defendant who appears to be a drug-dependent person receive an assessment to determine whether that eligible defendant is drug-dependent.

e. (1) At the pretrial detention hearing, the eligible defendant has the right to be represented by counsel, and, if financially unable to obtain adequate representation, to have counsel appointed. The eligible defendant shall be afforded an opportunity to testify, to present witnesses, to cross-examine witnesses who appear at the hearing, and to present information by proffer or otherwise. The rules concerning admissibility of evidence in criminal trials shall not apply to the presentation and consideration of information at the hearing.

(2) In pretrial detention proceedings for which there is no indictment, the prosecutor shall establish probable cause that the eligible defendant committed the predicate offense. A presumption of pretrial detention as provided in subsection b. of this section may be rebutted by proof provided by the eligible defendant, the prosecutor, or from other materials submitted to the court. The standard of proof for a rebuttal of the presumption of pretrial detention shall be a preponderance of the evidence. If proof cannot be established to rebut the presumption, the court may order the eligible defendant's pretrial detention. If the presumption is rebutted by sufficient proof, the prosecutor shall have the opportunity to establish that the grounds for pretrial detention exist pursuant to this section.

(3) Except when an eligible defendant has failed to rebut a presumption of pretrial detention pursuant to subsection b. of this section, the court's finding to support an order of pretrial detention pursuant to section 4 of P.L.2014, c.31 (C.2A:162-18) that no amount of monetary bail, non-monetary conditions or combination of monetary bail and conditions will reasonably assure the eligible defendant's appearance in court when required, the protection of the safety of any other person or the community, and that the eligible defendant will not obstruct or attempt to obstruct the criminal justice process shall be supported by clear and convincing evidence.

f. The hearing may be reopened, before or after a determination by the court, at any time before trial, if the court finds that information exists that was not known to the prosecutor or the eligible defendant at the time of the hearing and that has a material bearing on the issue of whether there are conditions of release that will reasonably assure the eligible defendant's appearance in court when required, the protection of the safety of any other person or the community, or that the eligible defendant will not obstruct or attempt to obstruct the criminal justice process.

g. When a motion for pretrial detention is filed pursuant to subsection a. of this section, a pretrial recommendation of no release pursuant to subsection f. of section 6 of P.L.2014, c.31 (C.2A:162-20) may constitute prima facie evidence to overcome the presumption of release as set forth in subsection b. of section 4 of P.L.2014, c.31 (C.2A:162-18), if the court finds probable cause that the eligible defendant committed any crime for which the eligible defendant would be subject to a mandatory term of imprisonment pursuant to subsection c. of N.J.S.2C:43-6 for a crime involving the use or possession of a firearm other than a violation of:

(1) subsection a. or d. of N.J.S.2C:39-3;

(2) paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection a. of N.J.S.2C:39-4;

(3) subsection a. of section 1 of P.L. 1998, c.26 (C.2C:39-4.1); or

(4) paragraph (1) of subsection b. or paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection c. of N.J.S.2C:39-5.

(cf: P.L.2022, c.43, s.1)

5. This act shall take effect immediately.

STATEMENT

This bill establishes a presumption of pretrial detention for a person who commits reckless vehicular homicide or strict liability vehicular homicide.

A person is guilty of strict liability vehicular homicide, a crime of the third degree, if the person commits vehicular homicide by driving while intoxicated. A person commits second degree reckless vehicular homicide if the person was operating an auto recklessly while under the influence in violation of N.J.S.A.39:4-50. Reckless vehicular homicide is a first degree crime if the defendant was operating the auto in violation of N.J.S.A.39:4-50 while on school property, within 1,000 feet of school property, or driving through a school crossing under certain circumstances.

Under current law, there is a rebuttable presumption that a defendant who is charged with murder or a crime that subjects the defendant to an ordinary or extended term of life imprisonment is to be detained pending trial. The rebuttable presumption applies when a prosecutor makes a motion for pretrial detention, and may be rebutted upon a showing of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, in favor of the defendant.

This bill provides that the rebuttable presumption of pretrial detention also applies to defendants charged with reckless vehicular homicide and strict liability vehicular homicide as established pursuant to N.J.S.A.2C:11-5 and N.J.S.A.2C:11-5.3. A defendant charged pursuant to N.J.S.A.2C:11-5 or N.J.S.A.2C:11-5.3 would be subject to forfeiture of the auto or vessel which was used in the commission of the offense, unless the defendant establishes at a hearing, which may occur at the time of sentencing, by a preponderance of the evidence that such forfeiture would constitute a serious hardship to the family of the defendant that outweighs the need to deter such conduct by the defendant and others.

Finally, the bill also permits a court, if deciding against the pretrial detention of a defendant for a violation of the reckless driving or strict liability vehicular homicide provisions, to order the suspension or revocation of the defendant’s license.