S930

An Act concerning the care and protection of domestic companion animals, amending and supplementing Title 2A of the New Jersey Statutes, and supplementing Title 4 of the Revised Statutes.

Be It Enacted by the Senate and General Assembly of the State of New Jersey:

1. N.J.S.2A:34-23 is amended to read as follows:

2A:34-23. Alimony, maintenance.

Pending any matrimonial action or action for dissolution of a civil union brought in this State or elsewhere, or after judgment of divorce or dissolution or maintenance, whether obtained in this State or elsewhere, the court may make such order as to the alimony or maintenance of the parties, as to the ownership for any domestic companion animals, and also as to the care, custody, education and maintenance of the children, or any of them, as the circumstances of the parties and the nature of the case shall render fit, reasonable and just, and require reasonable security for the due observance of such orders, including, but not limited to, the creation of trusts or other security devices, to assure payment of reasonably foreseeable medical and educational expenses. Upon neglect or refusal to give such reasonable security, as shall be required, or upon default in complying with any such order, the court may award and issue process for the immediate sequestration of the personal estate, and the rents and profits of the real estate of the party so charged, and appoint a receiver thereof, and cause such personal estate and the rents and profits of such real estate, or so much thereof as shall be necessary, to be applied toward such alimony and maintenance as to the said court shall from time to time seem reasonable and just; or the performance of the said orders may be enforced by other ways according to the practice of the court. Orders so made may be revised and altered by the court from time to time as circumstances may require.

The court may order one party to pay a retainer on behalf of the other for expert and legal services when the respective financial circumstances of the parties make the award reasonable and just. In considering an application, the court shall review the financial capacity of each party to conduct the litigation and the criteria for award of counsel fees that are then pertinent as set forth by court rule. Whenever any other application is made to a court which includes an application for pendente lite or final award of counsel fees, the court shall determine the appropriate award for counsel fees, if any, at the same time that a decision is rendered on the other issue then before the court and shall consider the factors set forth in the court rule on counsel fees, the financial circumstances of the parties, and the good or bad faith of either party. The court may not order a retainer or counsel fee of a party convicted of an attempt or conspiracy to murder the other party to be paid by the party who was the intended victim of the attempt or conspiracy.

a. In determining the amount to be paid by a parent for support of the child and the period during which the duty of support is owed, the court in those cases not governed by court rule shall consider, but not be limited to, the following factors:

(1) Needs of the child;

(2) Standard of living and economic circumstances of each parent;

(3) All sources of income and assets of each parent;

(4) Earning ability of each parent, including educational background, training, employment skills, work experience, custodial responsibility for children including the cost of providing child care and the length of time and cost of each parent to obtain training or experience for appropriate employment;

(5) Need and capacity of the child for education, including higher education;

(6) Age and health of the child and each parent;

(7) Income, assets and earning ability of the child;

(8) Responsibility of the parents for the court-ordered support of others;

(9) Reasonable debts and liabilities of each child and parent; and

(10) Any other factors the court may deem relevant.

The obligation to pay support for a child who has not been emancipated by the court shall not terminate solely on the basis of the child's age if the child suffers from a severe mental or physical incapacity that causes the child to be financially dependent on a parent. The obligation to pay support for that child shall continue until the court finds that the child is relieved of the incapacity or is no longer financially dependent on the parent. However, in assessing the financial obligation of the parent, the court shall consider, in addition to the factors enumerated in this section, the child's eligibility for public benefits and services for people with disabilities and may make such orders, including an order involving the creation of a trust, as are necessary to promote the well-being of the child.

As used in this section "severe mental or physical incapacity" shall not include a child's abuse of, or addiction to, alcohol or controlled substances.

b. In all actions brought for divorce, dissolution of a civil union, divorce from bed and board, legal separation from a partner in a civil union couple or nullity the court may award one or more of the following types of alimony: open durational alimony; rehabilitative alimony; limited duration alimony or reimbursement alimony to either party. In so doing the court shall consider, but not be limited to, the following factors:

(1) The actual need and ability of the parties to pay;

(2) The duration of the marriage or civil union;

(3) The age, physical and emotional health of the parties;

(4) The standard of living established in the marriage or civil union and the likelihood that each party can maintain a reasonably comparable standard of living, with neither party having a greater entitlement to that standard of living than the other;

(5) The earning capacities, educational levels, vocational skills, and employability of the parties;

(6) The length of absence from the job market of the party seeking maintenance;

(7) The parental responsibilities for the children;

(8) The time and expense necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable the party seeking maintenance to find appropriate employment, the availability of the training and employment, and the opportunity for future acquisitions of capital assets and income;

(9) The history of the financial or non-financial contributions to the marriage or civil union by each party including contributions to the care and education of the children and interruption of personal careers or educational opportunities;

(10) The equitable distribution of property ordered and any payouts on equitable distribution, directly or indirectly, out of current income, to the extent this consideration is reasonable, just and fair;

(11) The income available to either party through investment of any assets held by that party;

(12) The tax treatment and consequences to both parties of any alimony award, including the designation of all or a portion of the payment as a non-taxable payment;

(13) The nature, amount, and length of pendente lite support paid, if any; and

(14) Any other factors which the court may deem relevant.

In each case where the court is asked to make an award of alimony, the court shall consider and assess evidence with respect to all relevant statutory factors. If the court determines that certain factors are more or less relevant than others, the court shall make specific written findings of fact and conclusions of law on the reasons why the court reached that conclusion. No factor shall be elevated in importance over any other factor unless the court finds otherwise, in which case the court shall make specific written findings of fact and conclusions of law in that regard.

When a share of a retirement benefit is treated as an asset for purposes of equitable distribution, the court shall not consider income generated thereafter by that share for purposes of determining alimony.

c. In any case in which there is a request for an award of alimony, the court shall consider and make specific findings on the evidence about all of the statutory factors set forth in subsection b. of this section.

For any marriage or civil union less than 20 years in duration, the total duration of alimony shall not, except in exceptional circumstances, exceed the length of the marriage or civil union. Determination of the length and amount of alimony shall be made by the court pursuant to consideration of all of the statutory factors set forth in subsection b. of this section. In addition to those factors, the court shall also consider the practical impact of the parties' need for separate residences and the attendant increase in living expenses on the ability of both parties to maintain a standard of living reasonably comparable to the standard of living established in the marriage or civil union, to which both parties are entitled, with neither party having a greater entitlement thereto.

Exceptional circumstances which may require an adjustment to the duration of alimony include:

(1) The ages of the parties at the time of the marriage or civil union and at the time of the alimony award;

(2) The degree and duration of the dependency of one party on the other party during the marriage or civil union;

(3) Whether a spouse or partner has a chronic illness or unusual health circumstance;

(4) Whether a spouse or partner has given up a career or a career opportunity or otherwise supported the career of the other spouse or partner;

(5) Whether a spouse or partner has received a disproportionate share of equitable distribution;

(6) The impact of the marriage or civil union on either party's ability to become self-supporting, including but not limited to either party's responsibility as primary caretaker of a child;

(7) Tax considerations of either party;

(8) Any other factors or circumstances that the court deems equitable, relevant and material.

An award of alimony for a limited duration may be modified based either upon changed circumstances, or upon the nonoccurrence of circumstances that the court found would occur at the time of the award. The court may modify the amount of such an award, but shall not modify the length of the term except in unusual circumstances.

In determining the length of the term, the court shall consider the length of time it would reasonably take for the recipient to improve his or her earning capacity to a level where limited duration alimony is no longer appropriate.

d. Rehabilitative alimony shall be awarded based upon a plan in which the payee shows the scope of rehabilitation, the steps to be taken, and the time frame, including a period of employment during which rehabilitation will occur. An award of rehabilitative alimony may be modified based either upon changed circumstances, or upon the nonoccurrence of circumstances that the court found would occur at the time of the rehabilitative award.

This section is not intended to preclude a court from modifying alimony awards based upon the law.

e. Reimbursement alimony may be awarded under circumstances in which one party supported the other through an advanced education, anticipating participation in the fruits of the earning capacity generated by that education. An award of reimbursement alimony shall not be modified for any reason.

f. Except as provided in subsection i., nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the court's authority to award open durational alimony, limited duration alimony, rehabilitative alimony or reimbursement alimony, separately or in any combination, as warranted by the circumstances of the parties and the nature of the case.

g. In all actions for divorce or dissolution other than those where judgment is granted solely on the ground of separation the court may consider also the proofs made in establishing such ground in determining an amount of alimony or maintenance that is fit, reasonable and just. In all actions for divorce, dissolution of civil union, divorce from bed and board, or legal separation from a partner in a civil union couple where judgment is granted on the ground of institutionalization for mental illness the court may consider the possible burden upon the taxpayers of the State as well as the ability of the party to pay in determining an amount of maintenance to be awarded.

h. Except as provided in this subsection, in all actions where a judgment of divorce, dissolution of civil union, divorce from bed and board or legal separation from a partner in a civil union couple is entered the court may make such award or awards to the parties, in addition to alimony and maintenance, to effectuate an equitable distribution of the property, both real and personal, which was legally and beneficially acquired by them or either of them during the marriage or civil union. However, all such property, real, personal or otherwise, legally or beneficially acquired during the marriage or civil union by either party by way of gift, devise, or intestate succession shall not be subject to equitable distribution, except that interspousal gifts or gifts between partners in a civil union couple shall be subject to equitable distribution. The court may not make an award concerning the equitable distribution of property on behalf of a party convicted of an attempt or conspiracy to murder the other party.

i. No person convicted of Murder, N.J.S.2C:11-3; Manslaughter, N.J.S.2C:11-4; Criminal Homicide, N.J.S.2C:11-2; Aggravated Assault, under subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:12-1; or a substantially similar offense under the laws of another jurisdiction, may receive alimony if: (1) the crime results in death or serious bodily injury, as defined in subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:11-1, to a family member of a divorcing party; and (2) the crime was committed after the marriage or civil union. A person convicted of an attempt or conspiracy to commit murder may not receive alimony from the person who was the intended victim of the attempt or conspiracy. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to limit the authority of the court to deny alimony for other bad acts.

As used in this subsection:

"Family member" means a spouse, child, parent, sibling, aunt, uncle, niece, nephew, first cousin, grandparent, grandchild, father-in-law, mother-in-law, son-in-law, daughter-in-law, stepparent, stepchild, stepbrother, stepsister, half brother, or half sister, whether the individual is related by blood, marriage or civil union, or adoption.

j. Alimony may be modified or terminated upon the prospective or actual retirement of the obligor.

(1) There shall be a rebuttable presumption that alimony shall terminate upon the obligor spouse or partner attaining full retirement age, except that any arrearages that have accrued prior to the termination date shall not be vacated or annulled. The court may set a different alimony termination date for good cause shown based on specific written findings of fact and conclusions of law.

The rebuttable presumption may be overcome if, upon consideration of the following factors and for good cause shown, the court determines that alimony should continue:

(a) The ages of the parties at the time of the application for retirement;

(b) The ages of the parties at the time of the marriage or civil union and their ages at the time of entry of the alimony award;

(c) The degree and duration of the economic dependency of the recipient upon the payor during the marriage or civil union;

(d) Whether the recipient has foregone or relinquished or otherwise sacrificed claims, rights or property in exchange for a more substantial or longer alimony award;

(e) The duration or amount of alimony already paid;

(f) The health of the parties at the time of the retirement application;

(g) Assets of the parties at the time of the retirement application;

(h) Whether the recipient has reached full retirement age as defined in this section;

(i) Sources of income, both earned and unearned, of the parties;

(j) The ability of the recipient to have saved adequately for retirement; and

(k) Any other factors that the court may deem relevant.

If the court determines, for good cause shown based on specific written findings of fact and conclusions of law, that the presumption has been overcome, then the court shall apply the alimony factors as set forth in subsection b. of this section to the parties' current circumstances in order to determine whether modification or termination of alimony is appropriate. If the obligor intends to retire but has not yet retired, the court shall establish the conditions under which the modification or termination of alimony will be effective.

(2) Where the obligor seeks to retire prior to attaining the full retirement age as defined in this section, the obligor shall have the burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that the prospective or actual retirement is reasonable and made in good faith. Both the obligor's application to the court for modification or termination of alimony and the obligee's response to the application shall be accompanied by current Case Information Statements or other relevant documents as required by the Rules of Court, as well as the Case Information Statements or other documents from the date of entry of the original alimony award and from the date of any subsequent modification.

In order to determine whether the obligor has met the burden of demonstrating that the obligor's prospective or actual retirement is reasonable and made in good faith, the court shall consider the following factors:

(a) The age and health of the parties at the time of the application;

(b) The obligor's field of employment and the generally accepted age of retirement for those in that field;

(c) The age when the obligor becomes eligible for retirement at the obligor's place of employment, including mandatory retirement dates or the dates upon which continued employment would no longer increase retirement benefits;

(d) The obligor's motives in retiring, including any pressures to retire applied by the obligor's employer or incentive plans offered by the obligor's employer;

(e) The reasonable expectations of the parties regarding retirement during the marriage or civil union and at the time of the divorce or dissolution;

(f) The ability of the obligor to maintain support payments following retirement, including whether the obligor will continue to be employed part-time or work reduced hours;

(g) The obligee's level of financial independence and the financial impact of the obligor's retirement upon the obligee; and

(h) Any other relevant factors affecting the obligor's decision to retire and the parties' respective financial positions.

If the obligor intends to retire but has not yet retired, the court shall establish the conditions under which the modification or termination of alimony will be effective.

(3) When a retirement application is filed in cases in which there is an existing final alimony order or enforceable written agreement established prior to the effective date of this act, the obligor's reaching full retirement age as defined in this section shall be deemed a good faith retirement age. Upon application by the obligor to modify or terminate alimony, both the obligor's application to the court for modification or termination of alimony and the obligee's response to the application shall be accompanied by current Case Information Statements or other relevant documents as required by the Rules of Court, as well as the Case Information Statements or other documents from the date of entry of the original alimony award and from the date of any subsequent modification. In making its determination, the court shall consider the ability of the obligee to have saved adequately for retirement as well as the following factors in order to determine whether the obligor, by a preponderance of the evidence, has demonstrated that modification or termination of alimony is appropriate:

(a) The age and health of the parties at the time of the application;

(b) The obligor's field of employment and the generally accepted age of retirement for those in that field;

(d) The obligor's motives in retiring, including any pressures to retire applied by the obligor's employer or incentive plans offered by the obligor's employer;

(e) The reasonable expectations of the parties regarding retirement during the marriage or civil union and at the time of the divorce or dissolution;

(f) The ability of the obligor to maintain support payments following retirement, including whether the obligor will continue to be employed part-time or work reduced hours;

(g) The obligee's level of financial independence and the financial impact of the obligor's retirement upon the obligee; and

(h) Any other relevant factors affecting the parties' respective financial positions.

(4) The assets distributed between the parties at the time of the entry of a final order of divorce or dissolution of a civil union shall not be considered by the court for purposes of determining the obligor's ability to pay alimony following retirement.

k. When a non-self-employed party seeks modification of alimony, the court shall consider the following factors:

(1) The reasons for any loss of income;

(2) Under circumstances where there has been a loss of employment, the obligor's documented efforts to obtain replacement employment or to pursue an alternative occupation;

(3) Under circumstances where there has been a loss of employment, whether the obligor is making a good faith effort to find remunerative employment at any level and in any field;

(4) The income of the obligee; the obligee's circumstances; and the obligee's reasonable efforts to obtain employment in view of those circumstances and existing opportunities;

(5) The impact of the parties' health on their ability to obtain employment;

(6) Any severance compensation or award made in connection with any loss of employment;

(7) Any changes in the respective financial circumstances of the parties that have occurred since the date of the order from which modification is sought;

(8) The reasons for any change in either party's financial circumstances since the date of the order from which modification is sought, including, but not limited to, assessment of the extent to which either party's financial circumstances at the time of the application are attributable to enhanced earnings or financial benefits received from any source since the date of the order;

(9) Whether a temporary remedy should be fashioned to provide adjustment of the support award from which modification is sought, and the terms of any such adjustment, pending continuing employment investigations by the unemployed spouse or partner; and

(10) Any other factor the court deems relevant to fairly and equitably decide the application.

Under circumstances where the changed circumstances arise from the loss of employment, the length of time a party has been involuntarily unemployed or has had an involuntary reduction in income shall not be the only factor considered by the court when an application is filed by a non-self-employed party to reduce alimony because of involuntary loss of employment. The court shall determine the application based upon all of the enumerated factors, however, no application shall be filed until a party has been unemployed, or has not been able to return to or attain employment at prior income levels, or both, for a period of 90 days. The court shall have discretion to make any relief granted retroactive to the date of the loss of employment or reduction of income.

l. When a self-employed party seeks modification of alimony because of an involuntary reduction in income since the date of the order from which modification is sought, then that party's application for relief must include an analysis that sets forth the economic and non-economic benefits the party receives from the business, and which compares these economic and non-economic benefits to those that were in existence at the time of the entry of the order.

m. When assessing a temporary remedy, the court may temporarily suspend support, or reduce support on terms; direct that support be paid in some amount from assets pending further proceedings; direct a periodic review; or enter any other order the court finds appropriate to assure fairness and equity to both parties.

n. Alimony may be suspended or terminated if the payee cohabits with another person. Cohabitation involves a mutually supportive, intimate personal relationship in which a couple has undertaken duties and privileges that are commonly associated with marriage or civil union but does not necessarily maintain a single common household.

When assessing whether cohabitation is occurring, the court shall consider the following:

(1) Intertwined finances such as joint bank accounts and other joint holdings or liabilities;

(2) Sharing or joint responsibility for living expenses;

(3) Recognition of the relationship in the couple's social and family circle;

(4) Living together, the frequency of contact, the duration of the relationship, and other indicia of a mutually supportive intimate personal relationship;

(5) Sharing household chores;

(6) Whether the recipient of alimony has received an enforceable promise of support from another person within the meaning of subsection h. of R.S.25:1-5; and

(7) All other relevant evidence.

In evaluating whether cohabitation is occurring and whether alimony should be suspended or terminated, the court shall also consider the length of the relationship. A court may not find an absence of cohabitation solely on grounds that the couple does not live together on a full-time basis.

As used in this section:

“Domestic companion animal” means any animal commonly referred to as a pet or one that has been bought, bred, raised or otherwise acquired, in accordance with local ordinances and State and federal law for the primary purpose of providing companionship to the owner, rather than for business or agricultural purposes. "Full retirement age" [shall mean] means the age at which a person is eligible to receive full retirement for full retirement benefits under section 216 of the federal Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. s.416).

(cf: P.L.2014, c.42, s.1)

2. (New section) a. Upon the request of a party in a pending matrimonial action or action for dissolution of a civil union brought in this State or elsewhere, or after a judgment of divorce or dissolution or maintenance, whether obtained in this State or elsewhere, the court may enter an order of joint or sole ownership for a domestic companion animal taking into consideration the care of the domestic companion animal.

b. Upon the request of a party, the court may enter a temporary order directing one party to care for a domestic companion animal, prior to the final determination of ownership. The existence of an order providing for the care of a domestic companion animal shall not have any impact on the court’s final determination of ownership.

c. Upon the request of a party, or at the discretion of the court, the court may enter an animal protection order against either party, or both, to ensure the health, safety, and welfare of the domestic companion animal when there exists a threat, pertaining to the domestic companion animal, of an animal cruelty violation pursuant to chapter 22 of Title 4 of the Revised Statutes, Title 2C of the New Jersey Statutes, or any other State animal cruelty law. The animal protection order may require the person to refrain from interacting with the domestic companion animal permanently or for a period of time specified by the court. If determined necessary by the court, the court may issue an animal protection order requiring placement of the domestic companion animal in protective custody, as provided in accordance with section 7 of P.L. , c. (C. ) (pending before the Legislature as this bill).

d. The court shall give primary consideration to the well-being of the domestic companion animal when entering an order pursuant to this section.

e. As used in this section:

“Domestic companion animal” means domestic companion animal as defined in N.J.S.2A:34-2.

“Care” means the prevention of abuse and neglect and the provision of food, water, veterinary care, and safe and protected shelter. The term “care” shall include “necessary care” as the term is defined in R.S.4:22-15.

3. Section 7 of P.L.1991, c.261 (C.2C:25-23) is amended to read as follows:

7. A law enforcement officer shall disseminate and explain to the victim the following notice, which shall be written in both English and Spanish:

"You have the right to go to court to get an order called a temporary restraining order, also called a TRO, which may protect you from more abuse by your attacker. The officer who handed you this card can tell you how to get a TRO.

The kinds of things a judge can order in a TRO may include:

(1) That your attacker is temporarily forbidden from entering the home you live in;

(2) That your attacker is temporarily forbidden from having contact with you or your relatives;

(3) That your attacker is temporarily forbidden from bothering you at work;

(4) That your attacker has to pay temporary child support or support for you;

(5) That you be given temporary custody of your children;

(6) That your attacker pay you back any money you have to spend for medical treatment or repairs because of the violence;

(7) That you be given temporary custody of any domestic companion animal in your household;

(8) That your attacker pay you back any money you have to spend for veterinary treatment or repairs because of any abuse of, or violence against, a domestic companion animal in your household. There are other things the court can order, and the court clerk will explain the procedure to you and will help you fill out the papers for a TRO.

You also have the right to file a criminal complaint against your attacker. The police officer who gave you this paper will tell you how to file a criminal complaint.

On weekends, holidays and other times when the courts are closed, you still have a right to get a TRO. The police officer who gave you this paper can help you get in touch with a judge who can give you a TRO."

(cf: P.L.1991, c.261, s.7)

4. Section 3 of P.L.1991, c.261 (C.2C:25-19) is amended to read as follows:

3. As used in this act:

a. "Domestic violence" means the occurrence of one or more of the following acts inflicted upon a person protected under this act by an adult or an emancipated minor:

(1) Homicide N.J.S.2C:11-1 et seq.

(2) Assault N.J.S.2C:12-1

(3) Terroristic threats N.J.S.2C:12-3

(4) Kidnapping N.J.S.2C:13-1

(5) Criminal restraint N.J.S.2C:13-2

(6) False imprisonment N.J.S.2C:13-3

(7) Sexual assault N.J.S.2C:14-2

(8) Criminal sexual contact N.J.S.2C:14-3

(9) Lewdness N.J.S.2C:14-4

(10) Criminal mischief N.J.S.2C:17-3

(11) Burglary N.J.S.2C:18-2

(12) Criminal trespass N.J.S.2C:18-3

(13) Harassment N.J.S.2C:33-4

(14) Stalking P.L.1992, c.209 (C.2C:12-10)

(15) Criminal coercion N.J.S.2C:13-5

(16) Robbery N.J.S.2C:15-1

(17) Contempt of a domestic violence order pursuant to subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:29-9 that constitutes a crime or disorderly persons offense

(18) Any other crime involving risk of death or serious bodily injury to a person protected under the "Prevention of Domestic Violence Act of 1991," P.L.1991, c.261 (C.2C:25-17 et al.)

(19) Cyber-harassment P.L.2013, c.272 (C.2C:33-4.1)

When one or more of these acts is inflicted by an unemancipated minor upon a person protected under this act, the occurrence shall not constitute "domestic violence," but may be the basis for the filing of a petition or complaint pursuant to the provisions of section 11 of P.L.1982, c.77 (C.2A:4A-30).

b. "Law enforcement agency" means a department, division, bureau, commission, board or other authority of the State or of any political subdivision thereof which employs law enforcement officers.

c. "Law enforcement officer" means a person whose public duties include the power to act as an officer for the detection, apprehension, arrest and conviction of offenders against the laws of this State.

d. "Victim of domestic violence" means a person protected under this act and shall include any person who is 18 years of age or older or who is an emancipated minor and who has been subjected to domestic violence by a spouse, former spouse, or any other person who is a present household member or was at any time a household member. "Victim of domestic violence" also includes any person, regardless of age, who has been subjected to domestic violence by a person with whom the victim has a child in common, or with whom the victim anticipates having a child in common, if one of the parties is pregnant. "Victim of domestic violence" also includes any person who has been subjected to domestic violence by a person with whom the victim has had a dating relationship.

e. "Emancipated minor" means a person who is under 18 years of age but who has been married, has entered military service, has a child or is pregnant or has been previously declared by a court or an administrative agency to be emancipated.

f. “Domestic companion animal” means any animal commonly referred to as a pet or one that has been bought, bred, raised or otherwise acquired, in accordance with local ordinances and State and federal law for the primary purpose of providing companionship to the owner, rather than for business or agricultural purposes.

(cf: P.L.2016, c.77, s.1)

5. Section 13 of P.L.1991, c.261 (C.2C:25-29) is amended to read as follows:

13. a. A hearing shall be held in the Family Part of the Chancery Division of the Superior Court within 10 days of the filing of a complaint pursuant to section 12 of P.L.1991, c.261 (C.2C:25-28) in the county where the ex parte restraints were ordered, unless good cause is shown for the hearing to be held elsewhere. A copy of the complaint shall be served on the defendant in conformity with the Rules of Court. If a criminal complaint arising out of the same incident which is the subject matter of a complaint brought under P.L.1981, c.426 (C.2C:25-1 et seq.) or P.L.1991, c.261 (C.2C:25-17 et seq.) has been filed, testimony given by the plaintiff or defendant in the domestic violence matter shall not be used in the simultaneous or subsequent criminal proceeding against the defendant, other than domestic violence contempt matters and where it would otherwise be admissible hearsay under the rules of evidence that govern where a party is unavailable. At the hearing the standard for proving the allegations in the complaint shall be by a preponderance of the evidence. The court shall consider but not be limited to the following factors:

(1) The previous history of domestic violence between the plaintiff and defendant, including threats, harassment and physical abuse;

(2) The existence of immediate danger to person or property;

(3) The financial circumstances of the plaintiff and defendant;

(4) The best interests of the victim and any child;

(5) In determining custody and parenting time the protection of the victim's safety; [and]

(6) The existence of a verifiable order of protection from another jurisdiction;

(7) The existence of a verifiable animal protection order in the State or from another jurisdiction; and

(8) Evidence of a previous animal cruelty or abuse conviction or finding of liability for animal cruelty or abuse.

An order issued under this act shall only restrain or provide damages payable from a person against whom a complaint has been filed under this act and only after a finding or an admission is made that an act of domestic violence was committed by that person. The issue of whether or not a violation of this act occurred, including an act of contempt under this act, shall not be subject to mediation or negotiation in any form. In addition, where a temporary or final order has been issued pursuant to this act, no party shall be ordered to participate in mediation on the issue of custody [or] of a child or domestic companion animal, parenting time, or access to a domestic companion animal.

b. In proceedings in which complaints for restraining orders have been filed, the court shall grant any relief necessary to prevent further abuse. In addition to any other provisions, any restraining order issued by the court shall bar the defendant from purchasing, owning, possessing or controlling a firearm and from receiving or retaining a firearms purchaser identification card or permit to purchase a handgun pursuant to N.J.S.2C:58-3 during the period in which the restraining order is in effect or two years, whichever is greater. The order shall require the immediate surrender of any firearm or other weapon belonging to the defendant. The order shall include notice to the defendant of the penalties for a violation of any provision of the order, including but not limited to the penalties for contempt of court and unlawful possession of a firearm or other weapon pursuant to N.J.S.2C:39-5.

A law enforcement officer shall accompany the defendant, or may proceed without the defendant if necessary, to any place where any firearm or other weapon belonging to the defendant is located to ensure that the defendant does not gain access to any firearm or other weapon, and a law enforcement officer shall take custody of any firearm or other weapon belonging to the defendant. If the order prohibits the defendant from returning to the scene of domestic violence or other place where firearms or other weapons belonging to the defendant are located, any firearm or other weapon located there shall be seized by a law enforcement officer. The provisions of this subsection requiring the surrender or removal of a firearm, card, or permit shall not apply to any law enforcement officer while actually on duty, or to any member of the Armed Forces of the United States or member of the National Guard while actually on duty or traveling to or from an authorized place of duty. At the hearing the judge of the Family Part of the Chancery Division of the Superior Court may issue an order granting any or all of the following relief:

(1) An order restraining the defendant from subjecting the victim to domestic violence, as defined in this act.

(2) An order granting exclusive possession to the plaintiff of the residence or household regardless of whether the residence or household is jointly or solely owned by the parties or jointly or solely leased by the parties. This order shall not in any manner affect title or interest to any real property held by either party or both jointly. If it is not possible for the victim to remain in the residence, the court may order the defendant to pay the victim's rent at a residence other than the one previously shared by the parties if the defendant is found to have a duty to support the victim and the victim requires alternative housing.

(3) An order providing for parenting time. The order shall protect the safety and well-being of the plaintiff and minor children and shall specify the place and frequency of parenting time. Parenting time arrangements shall not compromise any other remedy provided by the court by requiring or encouraging contact between the plaintiff and defendant. Orders for parenting time may include a designation of a place of parenting time away from the plaintiff, the participation of a third party, or supervised parenting time.

(a) The court shall consider a request by a custodial parent who has been subjected to domestic violence by a person with parenting time rights to a child in the parent's custody for an investigation or evaluation by the appropriate agency to assess the risk of harm to the child prior to the entry of a parenting time order. Any denial of such a request must be on the record and shall only be made if the judge finds the request to be arbitrary or capricious.

(b) The court shall consider suspension of the parenting time order and hold an emergency hearing upon an application made by the plaintiff certifying under oath that the defendant's access to the child pursuant to the parenting time order has threatened the safety and well-being of the child.

(4) An order requiring the defendant to pay to the victim monetary compensation for losses suffered as a direct result of the act of domestic violence. The order may require the defendant to pay the victim directly, to reimburse the Victims of Crime Compensation Office for any and all compensation paid by the Victims of Crime Compensation Office directly to or on behalf of the victim, and may require that the defendant reimburse any parties that may have compensated the victim, as the court may determine. Compensatory losses shall include, but not be limited to, loss of earnings or other support, including child or spousal support, out-of-pocket losses for injuries sustained, cost of repair or replacement of real or personal property damaged or destroyed or taken by the defendant, cost of counseling for the victim, moving or other travel expenses, reasonable attorney's fees, court costs, and compensation for pain and suffering. Where appropriate, punitive damages may be awarded in addition to compensatory damages.

(5) An order requiring the defendant to receive professional domestic violence counseling from either a private source or a source appointed by the court and, in that event, requiring the defendant to provide the court at specified intervals with documentation of attendance at the professional counseling. The court may order the defendant to pay for the professional counseling. No application by the defendant to dissolve a final order which contains a requirement for attendance at professional counseling pursuant to this paragraph shall be granted by the court unless, in addition to any other provisions required by law or conditions ordered by the court, the defendant has completed all required attendance at such counseling.

(6) An order restraining the defendant from entering the residence, property, school, or place of employment of the victim or of other family or household members of the victim and requiring the defendant to stay away from any specified place that is named in the order and is frequented regularly by the victim or other family or household members.

(7) An order restraining the defendant from making contact with the plaintiff or others, including an order forbidding the defendant from personally or through an agent initiating any communication likely to cause annoyance or alarm including, but not limited to, personal, written, or telephone contact with the victim or other family members, or their employers, employees, or fellow workers, or others with whom communication would be likely to cause annoyance or alarm to the victim.

(8) An order requiring that the defendant make or continue to make rent or mortgage payments on the residence occupied by the victim if the defendant is found to have a duty to support the victim or other dependent household members; provided that this issue has not been resolved or is not being litigated between the parties in another action.

(9) An order granting either party temporary possession of specified personal property, such as an automobile, checkbook, documentation of health insurance, an identification document, a key, and other personal effects.

(10) An order awarding emergency monetary relief, including emergency support for minor children, to the victim and other dependents, if any. An ongoing obligation of support shall be determined at a later date pursuant to applicable law.

(11) An order awarding temporary custody of a minor child. The court shall presume that the best interests of the child are served by an award of custody to the non-abusive parent.

(12) An order requiring that a law enforcement officer accompany either party to the residence or any shared business premises to supervise the removal of personal belongings in order to ensure the personal safety of the plaintiff when a restraining order has been issued. This order shall be restricted in duration.

(13) (Deleted by amendment, P.L.1995, c.242).

(14) An order granting any other appropriate relief for the plaintiff and dependent children, provided that the plaintiff consents to such relief, including relief requested by the plaintiff at the final hearing, whether or not the plaintiff requested such relief at the time of the granting of the initial emergency order.

(15) An order that requires that the defendant report to the intake unit of the Family Part of the Chancery Division of the Superior Court for monitoring of any other provision of the order.

(16) In addition to the order required by this subsection prohibiting the defendant from possessing any firearm, the court may also issue an order prohibiting the defendant from possessing any other weapon enumerated in subsection r. of N.J.S.2C:39-1 and ordering the search for and seizure of any firearm or other weapon at any location where the judge has reasonable cause to believe the weapon is located. The judge shall state with specificity the reasons for and scope of the search and seizure authorized by the order.

(17) An order prohibiting the defendant from stalking or following, or threatening to harm, to stalk or to follow, the complainant or any other person named in the order in a manner that, taken in the context of past actions of the defendant, would put the complainant in reasonable fear that the defendant would cause the death or injury of the complainant or any other person. Behavior prohibited under this act includes, but is not limited to, behavior prohibited under the provisions of P.L.1992, c.209 (C.2C:12-10).

(18) An order requiring the defendant to undergo a psychiatric evaluation.

(19) An order directing the possession of any animal owned, possessed, leased, kept, or held by either party or a minor child residing in the household. Where a person has abused or threatened to abuse such animal, there shall be a presumption that possession of the animal shall be awarded to the non-abusive party.

(20) An order prohibiting the defendant or the abusive party from stalking or following, or threatening to harm, to stalk or to follow, any domestic companion animal owned, possessed, leased, kept, or held by either party or a minor child residing in the household, or from removing, harming, or disposing of any domestic companion animal owned or possessed by the victim of domestic violence or any other person besides the defendant or abusive party living in the victim’s residence.

(21) An order placing the domestic companion animal in protective custody until the person authorized by the court to assume the care or ownership of the domestic companion animal is able to do so.

c. Notice of orders issued pursuant to this section shall be sent by the clerk of the Family Part of the Chancery Division of the Superior Court or other person designated by the court to the appropriate chiefs of police, members of the State Police and any other appropriate law enforcement agency.

d. Upon good cause shown, any final order may be dissolved or modified upon application to the Family Part of the Chancery Division of the Superior Court, but only if the judge who dissolves or modifies the order is the same judge who entered the order, or has available a complete record of the hearing or hearings on which the order was based.

e. Prior to the issuance of any order pursuant to this section, the court shall order that a search be made of the domestic violence central registry.

(cf: P.L.2016, c.91, s.3)

6. (New section) a. In addition to the provisions of Title 4 of the Revised Statutes concerning the confiscation and restrictions on ownership of animals, the court, upon finding a person guilty of abusing an animal or otherwise violating the State animal cruelty laws, may issue an animal protection order against the person adjudged guilty of the abuse or other violation, requiring the person to refrain from interacting with an animal permanently or for a period of time specified by the court. The animal protection order may apply to a specific animal with which the adjudged person has had contact, or any other animal, as determined to be appropriate by the court.

b. Any person who knowingly violates a condition of an animal protection order issued pursuant to this section, and, as a result, causes injury to the animal that is the subject of the animal protection order, shall be guilty of a disorderly persons offense in addition to any other penalty that may be imposed for an animal cruelty violation.

c. As used in this section, “State animal cruelty laws” mean the provisions of chapter 22 of Title 4 of the Revised Statutes providing for criminal and civil animal cruelty violations.

7. (New section) a. Any authorized officer may enter onto private property and take an animal into protective custody:

(1) after obtaining a court order to do so pending disposition of animal cruelty charges against the owner of the animal or the person with custody or control of the animal involved in the commission of an animal cruelty violation; or

(2) to implement an animal protection order issued by a court pursuant to subsection c. of section 2 or subsection a. of section 6 of P.L. , c. (C. ) (pending before the Legislature as this bill) or an order issued pursuant to subsection b. of section 13 of P.L.1991, c.261 (C.2C:25-29).

b. If an authorized officer takes an animal and places the animal into protective custody pursuant to paragraph (1) of subsection a. of this section, the authorized officer shall request an immediate examination of the animal by a licensed veterinarian to determine if placement in protective custody is in the best interest of the animal. If an immediate examination is not possible, the authorized officer shall communicate with a licensed veterinarian as to the condition of the animal and request a determination as to whether protective custody is in the best interest of the animal. If neither option is available to the authorized officer, the authorized officer may determine that protective custody is in the best interest of the animal and place it in protective custody.

If an examining veterinarian determines placement in protective custody is not in the best interest of the animal, the veterinarian shall decide the disposition of the animal that is in the best interest of the animal.

c. Any animal taken into protective custody shall be placed in the care of an animal care provider. The animal care provider may not offer the animal for adoption or euthanize the animal until all parties have complied with the requirements of this section and a court has determined the final disposition of the animal.

After taking an animal and placing it into protective custody, an authorized officer shall provide notice to the owner of the animal within 24 hours after taking the animal that the animal has been placed in protective custody. If the owner is not known or cannot be identified, the notice shall be issued to the person last known to have custody of the animal. The notice may be provided in person, by telephone, or in writing by mailing the notice to, or posting the notice at, the last known address of the owner of the animal, the person with custody of the animal at the time the animal was taken, or the person last known to have custody of the animal, as appropriate.

d. Whenever an animal is taken into protective custody pursuant to subsection a. of this section, the owner of the animal shall be liable for the reasonable costs for necessary care of the animal. The animal care provider with custody of the animal shall petition the appropriate court:

(1) to require the owner of the animal to post a cost-of-care security deposit, bond, or other financial instrument pursuant to subsection g. of this section; and

(2) to issue an order to providing that, if the cost-of-care security deposit, bond, or other financial instrument is not posted or renewed in a timely manner, the animal shall be considered abandoned property and the animal care provider is authorized to assume ownership of the abandoned property, as defined and provided for pursuant to P.L.1999, c.331 (C.46:30C-1 et seq.).

The petition filed pursuant to this subsection shall include an estimate of the reasonable costs to the animal care provider of the first 30 days of providing shelter and necessary care for the animal.

A process server shall serve upon the owner of the animal, in person, by mail, or by posting it at the owner’s last known address, a written copy of the petition and a notice to the owner of the animal that failure by the owner of the animal to post the cost-of-care security deposit, bond, or other financial instrument as ordered by the court may result in the animal being considered abandoned property and the animal care provider assuming ownership of the animal.

e. At any time after the animal is placed in protective custody, the owner of the animal may relinquish ownership of the animal to the animal care provider by notifying the animal care provider in writing. If the animal care provider has filed a petition pursuant to subsection d. of this section, it shall immediately notify the court that the owner has relinquished ownership of the animal as provided in this subsection.

f. Upon receipt of a petition filed pursuant to subsection d. of this section, the court shall schedule a hearing for the posting of the cost-of-care security deposit, bond, or other financial instrument. If the animal is in protective custody pursuant to paragraph (1) of subsection a. of this section, the court shall also determine whether the owner of the animal has been charged with an animal cruelty violation. If the owner has not been charged, the court shall order the release of the animal to its owner and shall not proceed with the hearing.

The hearing shall be conducted as soon as practicable, but no later than 30 days after the date on which the petition is filed. Failure to hold a hearing within 30 days after filing of the petition shall not determine disposition of the animal or affect disposition of the animal cruelty violation.

g. The hearing required pursuant to subsection f. of this section shall not be used as a basis for a continuance or delay of a criminal or civil animal cruelty case, disposition of the ownership of the animal pending any matrimonial action or action for dissolution of a civil union, or after judgment of divorce or dissolution or maintenance, or the resolution of domestic violence charges, nor shall proceedings in a criminal or civil animal cruelty case, other than dismissal, be used as a basis to delay any decision or action by the court pursuant to this section. If the court authorizes any discovery in connection with the setting of cost-of-care security deposit, bond, or other financial instrument, there shall be no deposition of any party, witness, or representative, use of interrogatories, or demand to inspect any records outside the immediate reports and financial accountings concerning the animal in question from the animal care provider, owner of the animal, or person with custody or control of the animal at the time of the alleged violation or when the animal was placed in protective custody.

h. Based on the information and estimated costs presented to the court by the petitioning animal care provider, the court shall determine the amount sufficient to repay all reasonable costs incurred, and reasonable costs anticipated to be incurred, for the holding and care of the animal by the animal care provider for at least 30 days, and the required amount of the cost-of-care security deposit, bond, or other financial instrument to be posted as required pursuant to an order issued after a hearing held pursuant to subsection f. of this section.

The court may reduce the required amount of the cost-of-care security deposit, bond, or other financial instrument only if the court concludes, after consideration of evidence presented by the owner of the animal, that the owner is unable to pay the full amount. The court may determine a reasonable amount for covering the costs of necessary care for the animal that the owner is able to pay or may establish a reasonable payment schedule with the owner. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 1 of P.L.2009, c.317 (C.2B:12-23.1), or any other law, rule, or regulation, to the contrary, in no case shall the court waive the requirement for the owner to pay a cost-of-care security deposit, bond, or other financial instrument.

i. After making the determination pursuant to subsection h. of this section, the court shall order:

(1) the owner of the animal to post (a) the required amount of the cost-of-care security deposit, bond, or other financial instrument no later than five days after the date of issuance of the court order, and (b) an additional cost-of-care security deposit, bond, or financial instrument in the same amount every 30 days after the date of the order until final disposition of the animal cruelty violation or the animal involved;

(2) that failure to post any required cost-of-care security deposit, bond, or other financial instrument in a timely manner may result in the animal becoming abandoned property and the petitioning animal care provider assuming ownership of the abandoned property as provided pursuant to P.L.1999, c.331 (C.46:30C-1 et seq.); and

(3) the manner in which any cost-of-care security deposit, bond, or other financial instrument shall be posted and made available for disbursement to the animal care provider.

j. The animal care provider may draw from any cost-of-care security deposit, bond, or other financial instrument posted pursuant to this section any amount equal to the reasonable costs for the holding and care of the animal from the date that the animal is placed in the custody of the animal care provider to the date of final disposition of the animal, in the manner ordered by the court pursuant to paragraph (3) of subsection i. of this section.

k. There shall be a presumption against declaring the animal abandoned unless the owner has been found guilty of, or liable for, an animal cruelty violation involving the animal, or found by the court to have willfully not complied with the cost-of-care requirements ordered by the court pursuant to this section. Upon either such finding, prior to final disposition of the animal, the court may order, in response to a petition filed pursuant to paragraph (2) of subsection d. of this section, that the animal is abandoned property and authorize the animal care provider with custody of the animal to assume ownership thereof pursuant to P.L.1999, c.331 (C.46:30C-1 et seq.).

The court shall not find that an animal is abandoned property and authorize the animal care provider with custody of the animal to assume ownership thereof pending any matrimonial action or action for dissolution of a civil union, or after judgment of divorce or dissolution or maintenance, or resolution of domestic violence charges, until any other person with an ownership or custodial interest in the animal who has not been charged with an animal cruelty violation has been provided the opportunity to post the cost-of-care security deposit, bond, or other financial instrument required pursuant to an order issued after a hearing held pursuant to subsection f. of this section. If the court determines the animal may be released from protective custody into the custody of another person with an ownership or custodial interest in the animal, the animal may be released if the person satisfies any outstanding cost of care owed to the animal care provider. If the court determines the animal cannot be released from protective custody and the person with an ownership or custodial interest in the animal posts the cost-of-care security deposit, bond, or other financial instrument, the court may assign ownership to that person and the responsibility of paying for cost of care until final disposition of the animal.

l. The court may adjust the amount of any additional cost-of-care security deposit, bond, or other financial instrument upon a motion by either party, provided that an animal care provider shall not file more than one motion seeking an adjustment to a cost-of-care security deposit, bond, or other financial instrument. The owner of the animal may file additional motions as necessary to make adjustments to a cost-of-care security deposit, bond, or other financial instrument.

m. Upon final disposition of the animal, any remaining funds from any cost-of-care security deposit, bond, or other financial instrument which have not been expended for reasonable costs incurred for the holding and care of the animal shall be remitted to the owner of the animal or the person who posted the cost-of-care security deposit, bond, or other financial instrument.

n. No provision of this section shall preclude a seized animal from being held in protective custody as evidence. No animal held as evidence may be returned to a person who is the subject of a pending animal cruelty offense or any member of that person’s household while a criminal case is pending, without permission from the prosecutor handling the case.

o. No animal care provider shall be held liable for any damages related to the holding and care of the animal pursuant to this section, except in the case of recklessness or intentional misconduct.

p. As used in this section:

“Animal care provider” means any animal rescue organization or animal rescue organization facility, foster home, shelter, pound, or other facility authorized or otherwise used for holding and caring for an animal pending disposition of an animal cruelty violation, or disposition of the ownership of the animal pending any matrimonial action or action for dissolution of a civil union, or after judgment of divorce or dissolution or maintenance, or resolution of domestic violence charges.

“Animal cruelty violation” means a criminal or civil violation of an animal cruelty law in chapter 22 of Title 4 of the Revised Statutes.

“Authorized officer” means any law enforcement officer, municipal humane law enforcement officer, humane law enforcement officer of a county for the prevention of cruelty to animals, chief humane law enforcement officer, or certified animal control officer.

“Necessary care” means the same as that term is defined in R.S.4:22-15.

“Reasonable costs” mean costs incurred by an animal care provider to provide an animal with necessary care, necessary and proper and transportation of the animal, farrier services, and euthanasia, while the animal is in the custody of the animal care provider. Euthanasia shall be a “reasonable cost” only if it is necessary to euthanize the animal for health reasons as certified by a licensed veterinarian or for the health and safety of other animals held by the animal care provider.

8. This act shall take effect immediately.

STATEMENT

This bill provides for court designation of ownership or custody or court-ordered protective custody for a domestic companion animal involved in an animal cruelty violation, domestic violence, matrimonial action, action for dissolution of a civil union, or judgment of divorce or dissolution or maintenance.

Specifically, the bill provides that a court may issue, upon request of a party in a pending matrimonial action or action for dissolution of a civil union, or after judgment of divorce or dissolution or maintenance:

1) an order that provides for joint or sole ownership for a domestic companion animal taking into consideration the care of the domestic companion animal; or

2) a temporary order directing one party to care for a domestic companion animal, prior to the final determination of ownership and without impacting that final determination of ownership.

The court may also issue an animal protection order against either party, or both, to ensure the health, safety, and welfare of the domestic companion animal when there exists a threat of the involvement of the domestic companion animal in an animal cruelty violation pursuant to chapter 22 of Title 4 of the Revised Statutes, Title 2C of the New Jersey Statutes, or any other State animal cruelty law. The animal protection order may require the person to refrain from interacting with the domestic companion animal permanently or for a period of time specified by the court, or require placement of the domestic companion animal in protective custody as provided for in section 7 of the bill.

The bill also amends current State law concerning victims of domestic violence to allow for similar court-ordered protections for animals and notification to victims of domestic violence of their rights to protect their animals.

Furthermore, the bill provides for an animal to be placed in protective custody with an animal care provider when a court order is issued pending disposition of animal cruelty charges and the animal is involved in an animal cruelty violation or a court has issued an animal protection order for the animal. After the animal is in protective custody, the bill requires notice to the owner that the animal is in protective custody and provides for the animal care provider holding the animal to petition the court to require a cost-of-care security deposit, bond or other financial instrument to ensure the cost of care of the animal is paid for by the owner of the animal. The bill specifies that:

1) there is a presumption against declaring the animal abandoned unless the owner has been found guilty of, or liable for, an animal cruelty violation involving the animal, or found to have willfully not complied with the cost-of-care requirements; and

2) if another person has ownership or custody interests in the animal, that person may pay any outstanding cost-of-care security deposit, bond or other financial instrument and be assigned ownership by the court before the court declares the animal to be abandoned property.

Section 7 of the bill also provides that:

1) the cost-of-care security deposit, bond or other financial instrument must be posted every 30 days that the animal is in protective custody;

2) failure to post the original or subsequent cost-of-care security deposit, bond or other financial instrument may result in the animal being declared abandoned property;

3) the animal care provider may request one adjustment to the amount of the cost-of-care security deposit, bond or other financial instrument; and

4) the owner may request as many adjustments as necessary.

The bill specifies that the cost-of-care security deposit, bond or other financial instrument shall be used for payment of reasonable expenses while the animal is in protective custody. The bill defines “reasonable expenses” as costs incurred by an animal care provider to provide an animal with necessary care, necessary and proper and transportation of the animal, farrier services, and euthanasia, while the animal is in the custody of the animal care provider. The definition specifies that euthanasia would be a “reasonable cost” only if it is necessary to euthanize the animal for health reasons as certified by a licensed veterinarian or for the health and safety of other animals held by the animal care provider. Furthermore, “necessary care” as defined under R.S.4:22-15 means care sufficient to preserve the health and well-being of an animal, and includes, but is not limited to: food of sufficient quantity and quality to allow for normal growth or maintenance of body weight; adequate access to water in sufficient quantity and quality to satisfy the animal's needs; access to adequate protection from the weather; and veterinary care to alleviate suffering and maintain health.